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THE EARLY IDEAS ON NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS 
OF WILFRID BENNETT LEWIS* 
Ruth Fawcett** 
(Received 1 December 1985. Revised/Accepted 6 November 1986) 
Canada's initial involvement in the field of nuclear energy grew out of wartime cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. But after the end of the war, Canada con-centrated on developing the so-called peaceful aspects of the atom—the use of nuclear reactors for generating power. This note will focus on the views of one man, Dr W.B. Lewis, who throughout this period was in charge of Research and Development at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories. His early ideas on power reactors were remarkably advanced; in fact, as it turned out, too advanced. But further experi-mentation and discussion led to more practicable ideas for power reactors and cooperation between Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro culminated in the design and construction of a pilot power reactor. Many of the dis-tinctive traits of the future CANDU reactor were introduced in the pilot reactor, NPD. In looking at these early ideas on power reactors, we can see the basis for what has become one of Canada's most significant scientific and technical accomplishments. 
Canadians learned that their country had collaborated with the United States and Great Britain in developing the atomic bomb shortly after the first bomb was used to destroy the Japanese city of Hiroshima. First in Montreal and then at Chalk River, Ontario, a multi-national research team had been helping to solve selected problems in nuclear physics. Canadians were also introduced shortly after the end of the war to the idea that the energy within the atom could also be used as a source of power. In a Toronto newspaper, E.F. Burton, head of the Department of Physics at the University of Toronto, predicted that '[w]ithin 25 years [atomic power] will probably be our source of all energy. It will supplant coal and steam and oil and electricity. It is the beginning of a new era.'^ Carried away by the excitement of the moment he went on to predict that soon a three-day week and a six-hour day would be the norm. How-ever, Burton had not been involved in the nuclear energy project; scientists at work at the nuclear laboratories near Chalk River quickly realized that there were many dif-ficulties involved in obtaining power from nuclear fission. 
* An earlier version was read at the 4th Kingston Conference, 
Queen's University, October 1985. 
** Department of History, University of Toronto, Toronto, M5S 1K7. 
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These made the time scale of Burton's predictions seem very optimistic. In fact, it would not be until 1962 that any nuclear-generated electricity would'eriter Ontario's power grid, and a great deal of scientific and engineering work and discussion led up to that significant event. 
After the end of the war, many foreign scientists made plans to leave the project at Chalk River to return home to jobs they had abandoned in favour of war work. In particular, British scientists led by John Cockcroft, the director of the project at Chalk River, were anxious to return home to initiate an atomic energy programme there. To replace Cockcroft, the British suggested Wilfrid Bennett Lewis, and after considerable hesitation, he was appointed. In 1946 Lewis was only thirty-eight years old but had already had an impressive scientific career. Lewis received his doctorate in 19 34 from Cambridge University. He had worked with Rutherford in radioactivity and after graduating stayed on at Cambridge to work with Cockcroft on nuclear disinte-grations. After the outbreak of war in 19 39, Lewis was asked by the British air ministry to work on the development of radar. He remained with this work until, in 1946, he accepted the position of director of the Atomic Energy Division of the National Research Council at Chalk River.2 
A great deal of fundamental nuclear research was ongoing at Chalk River. Shortly after the end of the war, in September 1945, Canada's first reactor, ZEEP, had gone critical. Two years later a much more powerful experimental reactor, NRX, was successfully completed. Lewis was involved in every aspect of scientific life at Chalk River, and at the same time he was planning for the future. It was around this time that he first recorded his ideas on the possibilities of constructing a power-producing reactor. 
Lewis quickly recognized the many problems inherent in ob-taining power from a nuclear reactor. In December 1946, a few months after assuming his position, he wrote to his predecessor, Cockcroft, that '[i]t is the difficulty of releasing energy from nuclear fuel, keeping under control the rate of release and the disposal of fission products, which is the key to the economic development and applica-tion of nuclear power.'3 in another memo he foresaw the many problems involved in removing the heat from the pile, the unknown behaviour of various component materials under high temperatures and high neutron flux and the difficulties introduced by the presence of radioactive fission products.4 Even this substantial list did not cover the challenges facing the Chalk River group, but Lewis firmly believed that not only could these physical problems be solved but that in time nuclear power would also prove to be an economic source of usable energy. 
In his early reports, Lewis was anxious to emphasize the enormous potential of nuclear fission in terms of power pro-duction. Charts abounded showing the greater power reserves within one ton of fissile material as compared to one ton of coal. He also argued that reserves of coal and oil were 
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limited and therefore fissile material should replace them 
as a fuel in feasible situations. For example, since nuclear 
fuel could not provide land locomotive power, he argued that 
coal and oil should be reserved for this function. On the 
other hand, nuclear power could easily displace coal and oil 
in areas without water power where large electrical genera-
ting stations were needed. Also cited as an advantage of 
nuclear fuel was the ease with which it could be trans-
ported; this opened up possibilities of providing power in 
remote parts of Canada.* 
Although to Lewis the many fascinating scientific problems 
inherent in the development of nuclear energy alone justi-
fied its study, he recognized that for the programme to ad-
vance and be successful it would have to be economically 
viable. This, it was argued, could only be achieved by 
building very large plants producing in the range of one 
hundred thousand to one million kilowatts of power. The 
cost of such a plant was estimated in 194 7 to be between 
$100,000,000 and $300,000,000.6 The high capital cost of 
a power plant could be attributed to many factors but the 
most significant was the high cost of the fissile material 
used as fuel. There were a number of methods of obtaining 
fissile material. The most straightforward was to separate 
the fissile isotopes Uranium 235 and Uranium 233 from natural 
uranium. In the early postwar years, however, a perceived 
shortage of uranium made it necessary to find other methods 
of obtaining fissile isotopes. One method was to 'breed' 
fissile material from other more abundant elements such as 
thorium. When a nucleus of thorium absorbs a neutron, it 
passes through a number of changes eventually transforming 
into the fissile isotope U2 33. Lewis advocated the con-
struction of a 'breeding pile' in a director's report written 
in 1947.7 A 'breeding pile' was envisaged as a fissile 
core surrounded by a moderating substance. Neutrons released 
from the core would be slowed to thermal speed by the moder-
ator at which time they would enter the surrounding blanket 
of thorium and the reactions noted above would occur. It 
order for this process to occur successfully, it was impor-
tant that no neutrons be wasted. The importance of neutron 
economy was a theme throughout Lewis' reports, for if too 
many neutrons were wasted, a chain reaction would not be 
possible. Fission product 'poisoning' was another serious 
problem to be solved. When the nuclear reaction occurs, 
certain fission products begin to form which themselves 
absorb neutrons. Thus, to keep the reaction going, they 
must be removed at definite intervals. The method for doing 
so was not well defined but was difficult because of the 
high levels of radioactivity of the fission products. 
Lewis' interest in breeder reactors lay in their ability 
to produce valuable fissile material from abundant elements. 
This material could then be used to fuel a 'secondary' 
reactor, that is a reactor that only produced power. He 
did, however, suggest at the end of the report the possi-
bility that a breeder reactor could also produce useful 
power but did not expand œ this idea.8 
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Although Lewis recognized the many difficulties involved 
in obtaining power from a nuclear reaction, he felt that 
despite the uncertainty about the form a nuclear reactor 
would take, there was a demand for power which necessi-
tated fundamental research towards achieving that goal. 
This research was undertaken at Chalk River with the result 
that Lewis grew more confident in later reports that the 
goal of economic power from nuclear fission could be reached. 
In these early reports it is apparent that he was lacking 
experimental data to back his claims. But by the early 1950s, 
the two reactors at Chalk River, NRX and NRU, had provided 
Lewis with data to strengthen his case for the development 
of nuclear power. At that time Lewis argued that three 
major advances had been made which, in his ever-optimistic 
opinion, brought the possibility of economic nuclear power 
closer.^ First, through experience with the NRX reactor, 
it was found that uranium could be irradiated for much 
longer than previously expected without any reprocessing. 
It had been believed earlier that because of a rise in 
neutron absorption, fission products reprocessing would be 
needed following a much lower irradiation. As reprocessing 
was a very expensive process, this discovery meant a con-
siderable economic difference. Lewis argued that with the 
current prices of uranium, coal and oil, the larger irradia-
tion time meant that uranium was three to four times 
cheaper as a fuel. This brought natural uranium reactors 
and coal-fired reactors on a competitive level. 
The second advance outlined by Lewis in his 1951 report 
was that through the design of NRU it had been shown that 
it was possible to operate a reactor continuously at high 
output. This made it possible for fuel rods to be changed 
without shutting the reactor down. Finally, through further 
experimentation, it had proven possible to operate the 
system at high levels of irradiation, high temperatures 
and high pressures—all three of which were necessary for 
economic power. Note also that the type of reactor under 
consideration had changed. Although the breeder was still 
discussed seriously, it was not the only reactor type ad-
vanced as in earlier papers. Lewis was obviously concerned 
about both the difficult technical problems involved in 
chemical processing as well as expense incurred. The 
theme running throughout Lewis1 papers was economics. Un-
less the cost of nuclear power was comparable to that of 
conventional forms of power, he realized that the future 
of nuclear power was uncertain. This attempt from the 
beginning to link technology and economics is significant. 
The idea of selling plutonium produced in the reactor in a 
further attempt to reduce costs had been suggested by Lewis 
in his earlier papers. Plutonium was one of the possible 
fuels to be used in a breeder reactor but becuase of its 
military importance, it was difficult to obtain it in suf-
ficient amounts, and the United States was secretive about 
processes used to separate it. But the fact that plutonium 
could be used in a bomb made it a valuable commodity in the 
postwar years, and Lewis was not averse to cashing in on 
this advantage. Although it would mean shortening the fuel 
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radiation time, lewis was willing to process the fuel for 
plutonium if it meant a lowering of the cost of nuclear 
power. But he realized the difficulties involved. Fore-
most were the technical and scientific problems of separat-
ing the plutonium from the Ughly radioactive fuel. Then 
there was the complication of having an uncertain price for 
plutonium. He mentioned prices ranging from $6/g. to 
$120/g; obviously, this would be a crucial consideration 
in deciding whether to attempt to process the fuel. To 
Lewis, plutonium was of interest only insofar as it could 
help lower the cost of a nuclear power reactor.10 
Discussions about nuclear power reactors—possible types, 
costs, engineering and scientific difficulties—had been 
ongoing since 1947, but in 1953 Lewis stated clearly that 
a pilot plant must be built and outlined the stages involved. 
He wanted general specifications listing the limits within 
which the scientists and engineers would have to work. This 
was to be followed by a feasibility study which would pro-
vide a tentative design, specifying major components so as 
to provide an estimate accurate to twenty percent. Finally, 
a detailed design and construction would follow. Obviously, 
this type of planning would require a great deal of work, 
and it was suggested that Ontario Hydro cooperate with AECL; 
to accomplish this programme. The partnership was necessary 
as AECL staff were simply not available to work on the pro-
ject full time.11 
The goals in mind at this time were, in retrospect, overly 
optimistic. In 1954 Lewis wrote that the plan was to have 
the small pilot power reactor built by mid-195 8, a mere four 
years in the future. But of still greater optimism was 
the goal of commissioning two 100 MW stations by the end of 
1961. In the end, NDP—the pilot scale plant—did not begin 
operating until 1962. This gives one an idea of the diffi-
culties which lay ahead. 
Lewis was adamant about building a small pilot-scale reac-
tor. He argued that the feasibility and design studies 
should be kept very flexible so that beneficial changes 
could easily be incorporated into them. The design and con-
struction of a pilot reactor would provide invaluable know-
ledge and experience to the engineers who would move on to 
the construction of a full-scale plant. With his usual 
concern for the economics of power reactors, Lewis pointed 
out that the mistakes made on a small scale would be less 
costly and could be avoided for the large-scale reactors.^ 
Lewis1 arguments for building a small-scale power reactor 
were to prove sound. Although a great deal of knowledge 
and experience had been gained from the design, construction 
and operation of NRX and NRU, there were still many un-
knowns involved in the construction of a power reactor. 
Lewis insisted on a high degree of flexibility during con-
struction, sometimes at considerable cost. Such was his 
prestige that AECL accepted stopping work in 1957 on the 
pilot plant to allow time for a study on whether a pressure 
tube design was more desirable than the pressure vessel 
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design under construction. The recent success in making 
zircalloy pressure tubes had precipitated this study, and 
the decision was reached to use pressure tubes. This has 
become a distinctive feature of the CANDU reactors. In 
1956 the method of bidirectional fuelling was developed. 
This required horizontal pressure tubes in the reactor core 
with fuel moving across the reactor until by the time it 
reached the other side, it would be fully irradiated. These 
delays concerning design and the difficulty of the work 
postponed construction of the reactor, and it was not until 
1962 that it came on line, feeding the first nuclear-generated 
electricity into the Ontario power grid. 
Lewis1 involvement in these developments in nuclear power 
plants was crucial, but he was not acting alone. W.J. 
Bennett, who succeeded C.J. Mackenzie as president of AECL 
in 1953, supported Lewis1 power proposal in 1954 and backed 
his redesign in 1957. Lewis also received the backing of 
Bennett's successor as president, J.L. Gray, throughout the 
1950s. Finally, Harold Smith of Ontario Hydro used Lewis' 
concepts and turned them into workable reactors. The 
cooperation among these men, two of whom were engineers, 
made the development of nuclear power possible in Canada. 
From the beginning of his studies into the possibilities of 
generating economic nuclear power, Lewis had recognized that 
there would be a great many difficulties involved. As he 
noted in one memo in 1953, ' [tJ here is no hope of tumbling 
crude nuclear fuel into a pot and getting almost free 
heat.'13 But the number and the size of the physical and 
technical difficulties encountered had not been accurately 
predicted. It was the gradual realization of these that 
forced Lewis to move from the more complicated breeder reac-
tor design to a simpler heavy-water natural uranium reactor. 
It was this type of reactor which was built on a pilot scale 
and which has since been further developed to become the 
CANDU reactor. 
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